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DANIEL L. THORNTON
THE year 1982 was marked by rapid and variable
growth ofthe monetary aggregates. The growth ofMl,
the narrow monetary aggregate, was up sharply from
1981, while M2growthwas slightly above the previous
year’s rate. Of the three targeted aggregates, only M3
growth was lower in 1982 than in 1981. Moreover,
1982 marked the first time since the Federal Open
Market Committee (hereafter FOMC or Committee)
adopted its new procedures in October 1979 that the
fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter growth rate of Ml
accelerated.
As was the case in 1981, the Committee faced un-
usual uncertainties regarding the relative behavior of
Ml and M2 during the year associated with various
technical factors, regulatory changes and financial in-
novations. Furthermore, the income velocities of the
monetary aggregates, especially that of Ml, declined
relative to their historical norms.2 Because of these
difficulties, the Committee had considerable discus-
sion about the weight that should be assigned to Ml
Note: Citations referred to as “Record” are to the “RecordofPolicy
Actions ofthe Federal Open Market Committee” found in various
issues ofthe Federal Reserve Bulletin.
‘Fora description ofthe operating procedure, see 11. Alton Gilbert
and Michael Trehing, “The FOMC in 1980: A Year of Reserve
Targeting,” this Review (August/September 1981), pp. 2—22; and
Richard W. Lang, “The FOMC in 1979: Introducing Reserve
Targeting,” this Review (March 1980), pp. 2—25.
2
Theincome velocity ofamonetary aggregate isgivenby theratioof
nominal GNP to the aggregate. It indicates the number of times
each unit ofnominal money “turns over” in producing this year’s
final output. This conclusion about the record decline in velocity
was based on the fact that Ml growth had been rapid in the first
quarter compared with what would have been predicted on the
basis ofthe actual behaviorofnominal GNP and interest rates. This
interpretation was supported by the growth in relatively low-
interest-yielding savings deposits. See “Record’ (June 1982), pp.
366—67.
and M2 as a guide to policy. Ultimately, it decided to
suspend setting explicit growth objectives for Ml dur-
ing the fourth quarter of the year. This article will
review the factors affecting the long- and short-run
policy decisions oftheCommittee during 1982, includ-
ing those leading up to the decision to suspend setting
an explicit target for Ml.
ANNUAL TARGETS FOR 1982
The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act)requires the Board
ofGovernors to transmit to Congress, each February
and July, reports on the objectives for growth rate
ranges for monetary and credit aggregates over the
current calendar year and, in the case of the July
report, over the following calendar year as well.3 The
Committee has chosen to establish ranges from the
fourth quarter of the previous year to thefourth quar-
ter of the current year.4
‘~Theseranges must be reported to Congress each February and
July, although the Actprovides that the Board and the Committee
may reconsider the annualranges atany time. The period to which
the annual rangesapply, however, may not he changed. The base
period that the Committee has chosen (the fourth quarter of the
previous year) would remain the same even if the Committee
decidedtochange thedesired growth rates oftheaggregates forthe
year.
4
Before 1979, the Committee adopted one-year growth rates each
quarter, and the base period for theannual targets announced each
quarter was brought fonvard to the most recent quarter. This
method resulted in aproblem referred to as“basedrift. ‘Growth in
aggregates above (below) an annual growth range in a quarter
would raise (lower) the base level for calculating the next annual
growth path. The specification of annual objectives in terms of
calendar yeargrowth rates, which eliminates the base drift prob-
lem within a calendar year, does not solve this problem from one
calendaryearto thenext, sincenew rangesareestablished from the
end ofeach calendar year.
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Organization of the Committee in 1982
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At its February meeting, the Committee completed
the review, begun at its December 1981 meeting, of
the annual targets for the monetary and credit aggre-
gates for 1982. It remained committed to its long-
standing goal ofrestraining the growth of money and
credit to reduce further therate ofinflation, Neverthe-
less, Committee members disagreed about the precise
ranges toset forthe various monetary aggregates, Most
members favored reaffirming the ranges for Ml that
had been tentatively adoptedat theJuly1981 meeting.
A substantial number, however, favored a somewhat
higher range for M2 based on the belief that various
developments during the year would likely boost the
growth of M2 relative to Mi.5 Also, it was generally
agreed to give considerable weight to M2in interpret-
ing developments during the year.6
5At its midyear reviewofthe annual ranges, theCommittee estab-
lishes tentative ranges for the monetary aggregates for the next
year — measured fromthe fourthquarter ofthe current yearto the
fourth quarter ofthe following year.
6
See “Record” (April 1982), pp. 232—33.
In setting its growth range for Ml, the Committee
argued that the growth in “other checkable deposits,”
which had accelerated during January and which was
in large part responsible for the rapid January growth
of Mi, was likely to be temporary, and that the rela-
tionship between theMi growth andthe nominalGNP
growth likely would be closer to its historical pattern
during 1982. On this assumption, the Committee
argued that it would be acceptable forMl to grow at a
rate near the upper end of its annual range during
1982. The Committee also expected that the growth of
M2 would be high in its range, although somewhat
below that of 198l.~At the end of the discussion, the
Committee reaffirmed its tentative ranges forMl and
M2. These ranges are presented in table 1.
7
lndeed, the Committee believed that the growth in M2 might
meet or exceed the upper end of its range ifthe personal savings
rate grew more rapidly than anticipated, or ifdepository institrn
tions attracted an exceptionally large flow offunds into IRAs from
sources ontside of M2. See “Record” (April 1982), p. 233.
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aMessrs Black and Wallichdissented from this action because they favored specification of somewhat tower rates formonetary growth from
March toJune than those adoptedby the Committee, which would be associated with a relatively prompt return ofMl growth to its range for
the year
Mr. Black bet ievod that continued growth of Ml above its ringer- run range tor any extended period wou1d adversely affect economic
activity by exacerbating inflationary expectations and weakening markets for longer-term securities: for that reason, he felt that it was
particularly important to resist any surge in growth of Ml that might develop ru April
In Mr Wallich’s opinion, it woufo be desirable to restrain thepace ot prospective recovery •n economic activity consistent with some
reduction in the unemployment rate tosustain a degree ofp’essure for the continuation of the reduction ill the underlyingrate ofinflation
UMrs Teeters dissentedfrom this action because she tavored specification ofsomewhat higher rates of monetary growth from March toJune
with the objective of improving liquidity and easing financial pressures In her opinion, the time had come tofoster lower and less variable
interest rates in order to enhance prospects for significant recovery in output and employment.
‘Messrs Black, Ford and Wallich dissented trom this action because they favored a policyfor the perioo immeoiateiy ahead that was firmly
directed toward bringing the growth of Ml down to its range for 1982 by the end of the year They were concerned that accommodationof
relatively rapid growth over the summer months might eopardize achievement of the monetary objectives fortheyear and thus would risk
exacerbating infiationary expectations. Accordingiy they believed that tenoencies toward rapid monetary expansion in the months
immediately aheaa shouid be met by greater pressures on bank reserve positions and in the money market
Mrs Teetersdissentedfrom thrs action because she tavored specificationof somewhat higher rates formonetary growth during the third
quarter along with an approach tooperations early in the period that would clearly sienal an easing in poicy In her opinion, policy atthis
point shoulo be oirected toward exerting downward pressure on short-term interest rates ‘n order to promote recovery in output and
employment.
“Mr Wallich oisserited from this action because lie favored an approach to operations esily in the perioo that would iessen the chances ot
short-term interest rates remair.’ng be’ow the prevailing discount rate or tai.ing further below it. He was concerned that such interest rate
behavior wou~d tend toaccelerate monetary expansion and that the neLessary restraint ot reserve growth to curb such expansion might
‘ead to a sizable rebound in short-tern. tates with adverse implications for business ano consumer confidence
‘Mr Black dissentedfrom this action because he preferred to airect operations n tne periocin’mediately ahead toward restraining monetary
growth Although he was mindful of the current oifliculties ot nterpreting the behav:or of Ml. he was conrerneo that the recent strength rn
Ml might betoiioweo by sti-l more rapid growth nagged responsetothe substantiaideci’ne in short-terr interest ratesthat had occurred in
the summer, which c.ouio requIre even more restrictive operations later.
Mr Ford dissented from this action because he preferred a policy for tue period .mr”ediare.y ahead that was more firmly directeo’ toward
restraining monetary growth. athough he recogruzed that the benavior of Ml in palicular woulo be o~thcu’t to interpret. He was concerned
that the Committees policy directive might be misinterpreted in ways that couid adversely affect pursuit of the Systems longer-run
anti-inflationary obtectives. particularly ri the context of a highiy expansive fiscal po’icy program
Mrs Horn dissented from this act’on because she preferred to cont;nue setting a spec tic ob1ectivefor growth 01 Ml as we. as for M2
over the uurrentquaner ‘iolwithstano:ng the priinlems ut iriterpretir’g its behavior In setting a target for Ml.shewould to erate taster growth
early in rho period, owing to the uncertain mpact ot the proceeds from maturng al-savers certificates, and woulo givegreater weight IC)the
behavior of M2 for some weeks a~er the introduction of the new instrument at depository institutions
‘Mi Ford dissenteo frc’m th,s action because he believed that it mr’ the risk of complement ng very large budgetdelicits with substantial
increases in the supply of morley In his view. the result wouid be an oveny stirnulat~vecomoinationof policies that could re”cnde inflatior
and drive up interest rates during 1983
°Mr Black dissented because he preferred to d~rectpolicy in the weeks immediately ahead toward ensuring that the growth of Ml
abstracting from temporary effects ot the introduction of new money markeroeposit accounts. would moderate troni the extremeiy rapid
rare ot recent months Wlule recognizing ttie difficulties in interpreting Ml currerit.y. he was concerned that excessive underying growth in
that aggregate might reverse the progress achieved in reoucing ir’f.ation arid inflationary expectations and lead to substantiai’y weaker
markets tor long-term securities
Mr Ford dissentec from this action because be continued to prefer ap oicy br the current period that was more firmly directed toward
resiraining monetary growth. after a:lowance for the short-run mpact of the introduction o’ new money market deposit accounts He
remained concerned that rapid expansion n the supply of money together wth very ‘argo budget deiic’ts wouid produce an overly
stimalalive comoinatron of poltcies that could rekindle inflation and inflationary expectations and lead to higher interest rates ouring 1983
and 1984
“Mrs Teeters dissented from this action because she believed that somewhat higher monetary growth over the year ahead was needed to
promoteadequateexpansion ineconomic activityand a reduction inthe iateot unemployment Specifically. shet
0vored a rangeforMl that
was at least .‘.. percentage point higher than that adopted by thecomrr;ittee arid a range for M2 that provided forsomewhat greater growth
;n the broader aggregate retative to that in Ml
Mrs Teeters dissented from this action because she favored an explicit statement that growth of Ml above the upper end of the
Committee’s range tori 982 by 1 percentage point, or even as much as 1’’ percentage points niight be acceptable In her oplnion. it was
mportant to ind~cate the acceptable degree 01 growth ot Ml above the range in oroer to fostermarket behavior that woulo lower interest
rates and enhance the prospects br sustainng recovery in output and employment.
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Table 2
Planned Growth of Monetary Aggregates for 1982
(percentage changes, fourth-quarter1o-fourth-quarter)
Actual 1981 Proposed range Actual 1982
Aggregate’ growth rate2 for 1982 growth rate2
Ml 5 0% 2.5—5 5°’~~ 8.5%
M2 95 60—9.0 9.9
M3 114 6.5-95 l~4
Ml is defined as currency plus private demand deposits and other checkable deposits at depository
institutions exclusive ofdeposits due to foreigncommercialbanks ano officiab institutions, plustravelers
checks of non-bank issuers.
M2 is M’ plus savings and small-denomination time deposits at au depositoryinstitutions, shares in
money market mutual funds overnight repurchase agreements issued by commercial banks and
overnight Eurodollar deposits held by U S. residents at Caribbean branches of U.S banks
M3 is M2 plus large time deposits at all depository institutions and term repurchase agreements
issued by commercial banks and savings and loan associations
2
Data as revised by Board of Governors in January 1g83
Actual Money Growth in 1982
As shown in table 2, all three ofthe monetaryaggre-
gates exceeded their target ranges during 1982.8 Their
patterns of growth relative to their ranges, however,
were considerably different, as can be seen in chart 1.
Both Ml and M2 were above their targeted ranges
nearly all of the year. In contrast, M3 growth was
within its range during the firsthalfof1982and above it
during the second half.
Although both Ml and M2were above their target
ranges throughout the year, their growth rates dis-
played different patterns. While the quarter-to-
quarter growth of M2during 1982 was less stable than
that of 1981, it was stable compared with the quarter-
to-quarter growth of Ml. Ml grew rapidly in January
and was fairly flat until July, when it began a growth
spurt that accelerated markedly in October. This pat-
tern of Ml growth was basically consistent with the
Committee’s short-run objectives for the year.
SHORT.~RUNPOLICY DIRECTIVES
FOR 1982
The announced annual target ranges for the mone-
tary aggregates provide a basis on which the FOMC
5
The definition ofM2 was changed effective Februar 14, 1983, to
include tax-exempt money market ftmds and to exclude all IRA)
Keogh balances at depository institutions and money market
mutual funds. These changesalsoaffi~cted M3. Thus, data available
January 20, 1983, were used. The growthrates ofMl, M2 and M3
will differ from those reported from revisions after February 14,
1983.
chooses its short-run policy objectives during theyear.
The short-run policy directives, however, are theones
that influence the day-to-day implementation of
monetary policy. The Committee issues these direc-
tives for implementation by the Manager of the Open
Market Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
During 1982, the Committee specified short-run
growth rates for Ml, M2 and M3.°It also specified
intermeeting ranges for the federal funds rate as a
mechanism for initiating further consultations in
periods between regularly scheduled meetings.
Theseintermeeting ranges and theactualfederal funds
rate are presented in chart 2. The growth rate targets
for the monetary aggregates and the intermeeting
ranges for the federal funds rate that the Committee
specified during 1982 appear in table 1.
As in the previous year, discussions pertaining to
short-run policy decisions in 1982 were marked by
considerable uncertainty about both the effect of var-
ious regulatory changes and financial innovations on
the growth rates of the monetary aggregates and the
9
The short-run growth rate target for Ml was dropped at the Octo-
ber meeting and a short-run target for M3 was introduced.
10
ffmovements ofthe federal funds rate within the rangeappear to
be inconsistent with the short-run objectives for the monetary
aggregates and related reserve paths during the intermeeting
period, the Managerof Domestic Operations at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of ~‘1ewYork is to notify the Chairman, who in turn
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Chart 2
FOMC Ranges for Federal Funds Rate
1981 1982
NOlt, Rates a,, calculated as weels]~,a,e,ages al daUy ‘ales. At ‘cci, meeti,g the
tat the lUst 1,11 ,,eek they “crc In cHest.
relative weight that should be given to Ml and tv12 in
implementing the Committee’s short-run policy
decisions.1’ Indeed, therelative importanceofM2and
Ml for short-run policy purposes shifted during the
year.
Nevertheless, justas in 1981, short-run movements
in the aggregates during 1982 followed theirshort-run
target paths. This correspondence between the target
paths and actual growth ofthe aggregates is illustrated
in chart3, whichshows the short-run target ranges and
actual levels of Ml and M2, respectively, based on
first-published data. First-published data give a more
“See Daniel L. Thornton, “The FOMC in 1981: Monetary Control
in a Changing Financial Environment,” this Review (April 1982),
pp. 3—22.
t2
liecausc ofadefinitional change, data for M2 prior to February 5,
1982, are not first-published. Prior to that date. M2 included
repurchase agreements and isntitution-only money market
mutual funds.
accurate representation of the Committee’s short-run
policy decisions based on information available at the
time.’2 Chart 3 shows that short-run targets for Ml
were specified only for the first three quarters of the
year. During its October meeting, the Committee de-
cided to place much less weight than usual on the
narrow aggregate and not set a specificobjective for its
growth. At this time, the Committee began setting
short-run targets for M3.
First Qua-rter
The short-run targets for the first quarter of 1982
were made againstabackdrop ofrapid expansion in M2
and Ml from November 1981. The growth of both
monetaryaggregates accelerated during January 1982,
especially that of Ml. The Committee believed that
the rapid growth inthe demand for components of Ml
would abate duringtheensuing months. Itnoted that if
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such a decline were not forthcoming, the income
velocity ofMl would decline at apostwar record rate,
based on the then-projected growth of nominal GNP
for the first quarter. Thus, the Committee established
growth paths for Ml and M2 that, if achieved, would
move these aggregates closertothe upperlimit oftheir
annual target ranges. Specifically, the Committee
sought nofurther growthin Ml from January to March
and growth ofM2 at an annualrate ofaround 8 percent.
It wasagreed that somedecline inMl would be accept-
able in the context of reduced pressures in the money
market)3
Second Quarter
Continued uncertainty about the relative behavior
ofMl and M2 marked the short-run policy decisions
for the second quarter. Staffanalysis continued tosug-
gest that the demand for money might be expected to
moderate significantly in the second quarter. Further-
more, the Committee was concerned that technical
problems associated with the federal income tax dead-
line in April might result in an April bulge in Ml
growth. It was understood that most, if not all, of the
Ml growth for the second quarter might occur during
April. 14
Given these technical factors and given uncertain-
ties about near-term economic prospects and other
factors affecting the monetary aggregates, most mem-
bers ofthe Committee favored actions that wouldper-
mit modest growth in Ml over the second quarter.
Thus, the Committee set a short-run target for Ml of
about 3 percent, while maintaining the short-run
target growth rate for M2 at its first-quarter rate. Fur-
thermore, it noted that deviations from these targets
should be evaluated in the light that M2 was less likely
than Ml to be affected by deposit shifts and technical
factors over the second quarter.la
Third Quarter
In setting its short-run objectivesfor the thirdquar-
ter, the Committee noted that the growth of Ml and
‘
3
See “Record” (April 1982), p. 234.
11
See “Record” (June 1982), p. 368.
‘
5
The Committee reevaluated its positionfor the second quarter at
its May meeting. Most members agreed that somewhat more
rapid growth of Ml might he acceptable if it appeared to be
associatedwith a continued desire ofthepublic to build up liquid-
ity, and if the growth of M2 was near its specified range. See
“Record” (July 1982), p. 420.
M2forthe whole periodfrom March to June appearc
to be inline with its objectives forthat period(see cha
3). The Committee was increasingly pessimistic, hov
ever, about the outlook for the economy, and it coi
tinued to be concerned about the uncertainty over tli
public’s demand for liquidity and precautionaiy ba
ances. Additionally, it was concerned that themidye~
reduction inwithholding rates forfederal income tax
and the scheduled cost-of-living increase in soci~
security payments would lead to a bulge in Ml dunn
July. After a discussion of these factors, most of ii
Committee members agreed that they would accel
somewhat faster monetary growth in the third quarte
ifthe demand for liquidity and precautionary balance
did not ease as anticipated. Thus, the Committe
voted for faster growth for both Ml and M2 from th
second to the third quarter, increasing the Ml targe
fromabout 3 percent to about 5 percent and increasin
the M2 target from about 8 percent to about
percent.~
De-ernpha.~rizing Ml
At the October meeting, when the short-run objec
tives for the fourth quarter were first considered,
number ofnew considerations concerning the state c
the economy and financial markets emerged. Th
Committee was concerned that the general worsenin
of the world economy and financial problems associ
atedwith largeaccumulated external debts ofdevelop
ing countries in recent years had contributed to a
atmosphere of uncertainty that was reflected in th1
exchange valueofthe dollar, among other things. This
inturn, had serious implications for U.S. export indus
tries andfor the ability offoreign governments to pur
sue flexible monetary policies. Also, the Committei
was concerned that the U.S. banking system had beei
subjected to pressures associated with the general un
easiness about further credit problems both domesti
cally and internationally. The result was a genera
wideningofrisk premiums, with interest rates on pri
vate securities generally falling less than the rates or
Treasury issues from July to September. It noted tha
short-term interest rateshad tended to move up in th
weeksjust before the meeting. Furthermore, the com
mittee noted that the widely held expectations o
a spring or summer recovery had been disappointed
and there_were no signs of a strengthening in th
economy.
‘°Threemembers dissented fromthis actionbecause theyfiwored
policy of bringing growth of Ml down to its range for 1982 by
year-end, See table 1 or “Record” (September 1982), p. 548.
“See “Record” (December 1982), pp. 763—64.
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With respect to the monetary aggregates, the Com-
mittee facedtwo new concerns: First, alargevolume of
all-savers certificates would mature in early October.
Second, later in the quarter, the Depository Institu-
tion Deregulation Committee (DIDC) would imple-
ment the Gait-St Germain Depository Institutions
Act of1982andcreateanaccount that would beequiva-
lent to and competitive with money market mutual
hinds. While the exact nature ofthis new account and
the timing of its implementation were unknown in
October, it was known that the new account would be
free of interest rate ceilings and would have some
degree of usefulness for transaction purposes.18
It was believed that the maturing all-savers certifi-
cateswould induce a temporary increase in Ml, while
the new money market deposit accounts (MMDAs)
would depress Ml growth upon their introduction.
Because of these conflicting effects, the Committee
believed it would be difficult to interpret movements
in Ml during the months ahead.’9 It acknowledged
that the new accounts also would affect the growth of
M2; however, it believed that M2 and the broader
aggregates would be affected to a much smaller extent
than Ml. Therefore, it decided to set no specific
objectives for Ml growth for the fourth quarter, to
increase the weight given to M2 and to set short-run
policy objectives for M3.
Atthe November meeting, theCommitteeacknowl-
edged that the bulge in Ml growth, which it had
anticipated, had persisted longer than some members
expected, but staffanalysis suggested Mlgrowth could
be expected to decelerate over the remainder of the
fourth quarter. It was noted, however, that growth of
bothMl and M2could acceleratein the near term due
to a buildup of balances for eventual placement in the
new MMDAs.2° The Committee concluded that some-
‘
8
At the time of this meeting (October 5), the Act had not been
enacted (October 15). The Act required implementation of the
new account no later than 60 days after taking effect.
19
There was, however, some reasonto believe that theeffect ofthe
new money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) on Ml would be
minimal. See John A. Tatom, “Money Market DepositAccounts,
Snper-NO%Vs and Monetary Policy,” this Review (March 1983),
pp. 5—16.
20
By this time, the Committee knew that MMDAs would become
effectiveon December 14, 1982. See‘Record” (January 1983), p.
19.
what slower growth in M2forthe fourthquarter would
be desirable if such growth were associated with a
decline in market interest rates, and that somewhat
faster growth would be tolerated if exceptional liquid-
ity demands persisted. Once again, the Committee
decided not to set specific policy objectives for Ml.
The growthofM2during thefourth quarter wasvery
near theCommittee’s short-run objective (see chart 3).
The growth of Ml, however, was extremely rapid,
growing at an annual rate of nearly 14 percent. This
rapidfourth-quarter growth ofMl resulted inafourth-
quarter-to-fourth-quarter growth rate of 8.5 percent,
well above the upper end of the long-run target range
for the year.
SUMMARY
As in 1981, the FOMC argued that a number of
financial developments and innovations continued to
make it difficult to interpret movements in the two
principal monetary aggregates, Ml and M2, during
1982. From thebeginning ofthe year, the Committee
believed that M2was lesslikely to be affected by these
factorsthan Ml. Thisopinion wasbolstered by unusual
declines in the income velocity of Ml during the first
and fourth quarters of 1982. It was generally felt that
considerable weight should be given to M2 in inter-
preting developments during the year. The Commit-
tee increased the weight given to M2during the year,
ultimately dropping Ml as an explicit intermediate
policy target for the fourth quarter.
Nevertheless, the growth of both Ml and M2 fol-
lowed the short-run growth objectives ofthe Commit-
tee fairly closely during the year. Growth of Ml was
near the Committee’s short-run path until the fourth
quarter, when short-run growth objectives for the
aggregate were dropped. Actual growth of M2 was
near the Committee’s desired short-run path for the
entire year. Rapidfourth-quarter growth of Ml, how-
ever, pushed its growth well above the Committee’s
long-run range.
I
35